We show that the community of accounting researchers has not fully appreciated the sensitivity of research conclusions to (necessarily) subjective research design choices, and that this failure has led to the subsequent overgeneralization of early evidence. Our analysis is based on a case study that examines the eects of two basic research design choices, and subsequent researchers' appreciation of the impact of those choices. To enhance our study's accessibility to a broad cross-section of the accounting research community, our case study focuses on an article that is covered in most accounting doctoral programs Ð the recipient of the second American Accounting Associatioǹ`S eminal Contribution to Accounting Literature Award'' Ð Beaver's 1968 article on the information content of annual earnings announcements [Beaver, W. (1968) . The information content of annual earnings announcements. Empirical research in accounting; Selected studies, 1968. Supplement to Journal of Accounting Research, 6, 67±92.] Our analysis reveals that the research design choices in Beaver's study signi®cantly aected the results. Beaver clearly explained these choices, and was careful in drawing inferences. Nevertheless, subsequent researchers interpreted Beaver's evidence too broadly. Our new empirical evidence suggests that the information content inference is much more fragile than is generally suspected. We also present citation analyses showing that, consistent with the Kuhnian view that adherents of a paradigm tend to ignore (later) anomalous evidence, subsequent researchers largely overlooked post-Beaver evidence that was inconsistent with the paradigm's interpretation of Beaver's results. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of how cognitive biases of individuals, combined with biases inherent in the review process and the academy in general, foster an environment where the placement of the ®rst research bricks aect the whole wall. While the case study focuses on an archival empirical ®nancial accounting study, consideration of the eects of subjective research design choices and the documented de®ciencies in the interpretation of research are relevant to empirical accounting researchers in general and to critical theorists, as well.
Introduction
What is a fact? A fact is merely an opinion held by allF F F Leamer (1983) . This paper examines the development of a major accounting research paradigm in the context of Kuhn's (1970) scienti®c revolution framework. Consistent with Kuhn's arguments that a paradigm's disciples take for granted their paradigm's foundations, we show that accounting researchers have failed to appreciate fully the likely eects of (necessarily) subjective research design choices made in seminal research. Our study shows that research design choices signi®cantly aected evidence reported in early research. We also show that subsequent research generalized initial seminal studies' results too broadly, and largely overlooked subsequent evidence based on complementary research design choices that reported results contrary to what had become the paradigm's core beliefs. Thus, while accounting scholars`think we understand' the impact of subjective research design choices, the evidence presented here suggests that we have collectively failed to apply this understanding in practice. Such failures are unfortunate because they delay the acquisition of knowledge.
This issue is important in all areas of accounting research, and we address this void in the literature by providing new empirical evidence on the impact of research design choices in the context of an archival empirical study that should be familiar to most accounting scholars: Beaver's (1968) seminal paper, The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements. This is the second of only two papers to receive the American Accounting Association's prestigious``Seminal Contribution to Accounting Literature Award,'' 1 and Brown (1996) identi®es Beaver (1968) as one of the ten most in¯uential articles in accounting research. At the outset, we emphasize that our purpose is not to criticize Beaver's seminal study or diminish its importance as a signi®cant contribution to the literature. Rather, our criticism focusses on the subsequent behavior of the academy in interpreting and propagating the implications of Beaver's study.
While the case study focusses on Beaver (1968) , our study contributes more broadly to an understanding of the conduct and interpretation of research. We focus on often overlooked eects of subjective research design choices, and we document de®ciencies in subsequent researchers' interpretation of seminal research. These issues are as relevant to experimental accounting researchers and critical theorists as they are to ®nancial accounting researchers.
Our analysis begins with a review of the historical context in which Beaver (1968) was conducted and published. This historical context is key to understanding why Beaver's study became so in¯uential, and in particular, why it has become the basis upon which subsequent research inferred the`stylized fact' that earnings announcements convey new information to the market.
2 First, consistent with Kuhn's (1970) view that adherents of a paradigm tend to ignore (later) anomalous evidence, we show that subsequent researchers largely overlooked post-Beaver evidence that was inconsistent with the paradigm's interpretation of Beaver's results. Second, while Beaver was careful not to overstate his study's results, our citation analysis shows that subsequent research did interpret Beaver's evidence too broadly, consistent with Kuhn's (1970) claim that later disciples of a paradigm take for granted the paradigm's foundations. Speci®cally, subsequent researchers largely failed to recognize the impact of two aspects of Beaver's research design choices on the study's empirical results. Subsequent research has implicitly inferred that the mean result emphasized in the study is typical' of market reactions to individual earnings announcements. And subsequent research has also failed to appreciate the implications of Beaver's sample selection criteria for the empirical 1 Ball and Brown (1968) was the ®rst recipient of the award. 2 Like Beaver (1968) , we focus on the incremental information content of accounting earnings announcements Ð whether the announcements convey``new news'' to the market, as indicated by unusual price movements. Incremental information content requires not only that accounting earnings announcements convey value-relevant information, but also that these accounting disclosures are timely enough to convey new valuerelevant information to the market. results. After considering the historical evolution of the information content research paradigm, we provide new empirical evidence on the impact of each of these research design choices. Our evidence suggests the inferences subsequent research drew from Beaver's (1968) results are more fragile than is generally suspected.
With respect to the ®rst research design choice Ð the emphasis on the cross-sectional mean market reaction Ð we ®nd that a focus on mean eects obscures the fact that most individual earnings announcements are not associated with unusual price reactions. Thus, the ®rst misinterpretation of Beaver's evidence is the tendency to view mean market reactions (such as those saliently presented in Beaver's famous Figs. 1, 3 and 6) as representative of the typical stock price reactions to individual earnings announcements. This misinterpretation can be viewed as a manifestation of Kahneman and Tversky's (1972) representativeness heuristic. As Hogarth explains,``We tend to imagine that what we seeF F Fis typical of what can occurF F FHence we tend to assess distributions which are too`tight'.'' (Hogarth, 1987, p. 268, emphasis in original) . With respect to the second research design choice Ð sample selection criteria Ð subsequent research citing Beaver's information content result has largely overlooked the fact that Beaver's sample was based on a set of relatively small ®rms. 3 Beaver's sample included only non-12/31 NYSE ®rms with less than 20 news items in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ, hereafter) during that calendar year. These sample selection criteria led to a sample of 143 relatively small ®rms that comprised only about 5% of the period's total market value of NYSE ®rms. To assess the eects of these sample selection criteria, we repeat our analyses, choosing an alternative set of ®rms that would have been at least equally interesting at the time when there was no empirical evidence on the information content of any ®rms' earnings announcements Ð the era's Fortune 200 ®rms. As these ®rms comprised 67% of the market value of the NYSE during that time period, the information content of these earnings announcements would have been of interest in their own right. With 30 years of research hindsight, it is not surprising to ®nd that the Fortune 200 ®rms' earnings announcements generate smaller market reactions than do earnings announcements of`Beaver-like' ®rms. What is more surprising is that for Fortune 200 ®rms, the announcement week mean price reaction is not statistically dierent from the mean price movements in 11 of the 16 surrounding weeks. Further, most of the individual Fortune 200 earnings announcements do not generate unusual market reactions.
The ®nal section of this paper argues that cognitive biases of individuals combined with biases in the review process and the academy in general foster an environment where the``placement of the ®rst [research] bricks aect the whole wall.'' Had the initial information content studies made dierent research design choices Ð either by focusing on the extent to which individual earnings announcements were informative, or by not using samples of relatively small ®rms, the apparent information content would have been much less dramatic, and perhaps even non-existent. However, the research design choices made in Beaver (1968) and other early information content studies (e.g. May, 1971) yielded results suggesting that earnings announcements had extensive information content. Although Beaver was careful not to over-generalize his results, the conclusion that earnings announcements convey new information to the market soon became the received wisdom.
In the Kuhnian sense, subsequent researchers took this notion for granted as one of the pillars of the price-earnings research paradigm:``Any person familiar with the`real world' knows that the market reacts strongly (and perhaps overreacts) to earnings-per-share data'' (Kaplan, 1978, p. 138) . This view was not seriously challenged for many years, thereby delaying the acquisition of knowledge. It was not until 17 years after Beaver (1968) that Atiase's (1985) seminal investigation of cross-sectional dierences in the information content of earnings announcements revealed that small ®rms' announcements are more informative 3 It has also been largely forgotten that the next major information content study, May (1971) , examined the market's reaction to interim earnings announcements of AMEX ®rms, which are also smaller on average than NYSE ®rms. than large ®rms' announcements, on average. Now our study presents new evidence that most earnings announcements Ð even those of the small Beaver-like' ®rms Ð are not associated with unusual price reactions. This evidence raises questions about the information content of`typical' earnings announcements, which in turn supports the Jenkins Committee's call for expansion of the role of accounting and auditing beyond the conventional ®nancial statements to encompass a broader notion of business reporting (American Institute of Certi®ed Public Accountants, AICPA, 1994) .
In sum, we show that research design choices signi®cantly aected the results of seminal information content studies, but subsequent research largely failed to recognize the impact of these choices on the generalizability of the early evidence. While accounting scholars``think we understand'' that research design choices aect research results and their generalizability, the evidence presented here suggests that we have collectively failed to apply this understanding in practice. This delays the acquisition of knowledge and results in misallocation of research resources (for example, decades passed before serious questions were raised about the extent to which earnings announcements convey`new news' to the market). 4 The intent of this study is to reduce our collective susceptibility to such biases in the future, by providing a salient demonstration why we must constantly remain on guard to recognize the subjective nature of research design choices, to consider the likely eects of those choices, and to be cautious in drawing generalizations.
Evolution of thought regarding the information content of accounting earnings announcements

Development of the paradigm
Appreciation of the importance of Beaver's (1968) seminal evidence and the eect of misinterpretation of his evidence by subsequent research requires an understanding of the historical context in which Beaver's study was conducted and published. We frame the development of accounting research in terms of Kuhn's (1970) description of the evolution from unorganized, unstructured, independent``pre-paradigm'' activity toward the development of a scienti®c paradigm and the practice of what Kuhn terms`n ormal science. '' 5,6 We describe the pivotal role Beaver played in stimulating the development of the price-earnings research paradigm. We also show that subsequent adherents of the paradigm largely overlooked anomalous evidence counter to the paradigm's core beliefs, as Kuhn suggests is typical in normal science.
Pre-paradigm activity in accounting
In¯uential writers like Paton and Littleton (1940, pp. 98±99) advanced the so-called``entity theory'' view that corporate earnings is the focal point of accounting: 7 4 Mouck (1998) also raises questions about the validity of inferences from capital markets research in accounting, but his questions are based on the assumption that security prices are not reasonable ®rst-order approximations of ®rm value. Our study demonstrates that even without Mouck's assumption Ð that is, even within the existing capital markets research paradigm Ð one can still raise serious questions about certain inferences that have become embedded in the core foundation of the price-earnings research paradigm.
5 Wells (1976) and Mouck (1993) also discuss accounting research in the context of Kuhn's (1970) theory of scienti®c revolutions. In contrast to those studies, we focus on the role Beaver (1968) played in the development of modern priceearnings research, viewed in the context of Kuhn's framework. 6 In relying on Kuhn's framework, we also use his labels for the stages of scienti®c evolution: (1)`pre-paradigm' activity, (2) a paradigm-shifting`notable scienti®c achievement,' and (3) normal science.' Kuhn concludes that normal science is fraught with shortcomings, including a tendency to dismiss anomalous evidence and to focus on increasingly trivial research issues (which he terms`puzzle-solving'). We provide evidence supporting these allegations in the context of accounting research. Thus, the label`normal science' should not be construed as a synonym for`truth-discovery' and more generally, the labels`pre-paradigm' and`normal science' do not imply the superiority of one over the other. 7 In contrast, recent FASB pronouncements tend to emphasize the primacy of the balance sheet and the appropriate valuation of assets and liabilities, rather than the income statement (e.g., SFAS 109 changed accounting for deferred income taxes from the deferred method to the liability method). We thank former FASB chairman Dennis Beresford for pointing this out to us.
[B]usiness men and public accountants have been placing an increasing emphasis on the income statement in recent years± [such] that the income report has supplanted the balance sheet as a focus of attention.
This perspective suggests that the de®nition and computation of corporate earnings, and the resulting informativeness of those earnings, are among the most critical issues facing accountants.
Consequently, it is not surprising that the accounting literature prior to 1968 was dominated by normative position papers centering on the de®-nition and computation of corporate earnings Ð the nature of`true economic income', how this construct should be measured, and how close the day's accounting rules were to reporting`true economic income'. Since no common set of beliefs or methods existed, each writer laid arguments, starting anew from independent and study-speci®c foundations (American Accounting Association, 1977) . This led to an unorganized and unstructured body of literature with divergent assumptions and conclusions, and no apparent means of achieving consensus. Mouck (1993) points out that this is characteristic of what Kuhn terms``pre-paradigm'' activity.
Some authors of the period suggested that investors ®nd accounting earnings useful in making investment decisions.
As long ago as September 1932, a committee of the [American] Institute [of Accountants] said,`... the income account is usually far more important than the balance sheet.' This shift in the emphasis placed on ®nancial statements is largely due to the signi®cance that has been placed on earnings capacity in valuing corporate securities (Blough, 1937, p. 283) .
Investors use accountants' reported income as an index, for when a past income increases, investors interpret it to mean that the index of enterprise success has gone up. They therefore buy the stock at a higher price.... (Bedford, 1957, p. 60 ).
[T]he annual net earnings ®gure tends to have a magical signi®cance Ð not only for the ordinary investor but for security analysts and even for acquisition-minded managements (Forbes, May 1967, p. 28 ).
Other authors scoed at the usefulness of earnings, arguing that the arbitrary nature of accounting procedures and the failure to require their uniform application led to`no very accurate measure of the pro®ts of corporations'. (Greer, 1938, p. 341) .
[N]et income can never be supposed to be a fact in any sense at all except that it is the ®gure that results when the accountant has ®nished applying the procedures which he adopts (Canning, 1929, p. 99) .
[One author asserts that] the accepted method of making up pro®t and loss statements is remarkable for its obscuring of its essential facts.... [another] author compares the traditional methods of valuation to`measuring a ®eld with a rubber tape line' (Gilman 1939, p. 5 ).
Entity income is not a meaningful concept....
[N]or can entity [income] calculations be readily translated into meaningful data for the investor, so far as the orthodox form of income report is concerned. (Vatter, 1947, pp. 33±34 ).
All invented values, such as L.I.F.O. valuations, calculated depreciation ®gures, amounts of`deferred' charges and credits, were not measures of anything. (Chambers, 1974, p. xiii) .
Some opined that even if earnings were meaningful, the potential information content of earnings announcements would be usurped by more timely sources of information, and accounting earnings announcements would be too late to be useful to investors: I would argue that reported earnings are of key importance in investment decisions but that they become gradually more deducible and, in fact, are generally relatively accurately deduced before they are reported (Parker, 1967, p. 16 ).
Thus, pre-1968 discussion of the informativeness of earnings either supported the utility of earnings for investors, or else expressed skepticism concerning the informativeness of earnings. This dialogue aptly illustrates Kuhn's description of pre-paradigm activity:
in the early stages of the development of any science dierent men confronting the same range of phenomenaF F Fdescribe and interpret them in dierent ways (Kuhn, 1970, p. 17) .
While the normative position papers provided important bases for development of the accounting discipline (including identi®cation of corporate earnings as a legitimate issue for study), the inductive and deductive reasoning these papers employed was incapable of resolving their dierences. In the absence of empirical evidence, the discipline was not converging on the important question whether accounting earnings announcements do (as opposed to should) convey`new news' to investors.
2.1.2.``Notable scienti®c achievements'' leading to the birth of the price-earnings research paradigm
During the 1960's, advances in computational power permitted collection and analysis of data on a much larger scale than was previously possible. The coincident development of the Ecient Markets Hypothesis, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and event study methodology, 8 along with the availability of massive quantities of security markets data in machine-readable form (from CRSP), set the stage for large-scale empirical research that could investigate the price±earnings relation. The early capital market studies in accounting (Ball & Brown 1968; Beaver 1968; Benston 1967) provided the``notable scienti®c achievements'' that Kuhn (1970, p. 178) suggests are necessary for the establishment of a scienti®c paradigm.
One smaller-scale study of the earnings±price relation had already appeared, serving as a precursor to the more sophisticated, larger-scale, late-1960's studies that would be perceived as notable scienti®c achievements. Ashley (1962) reported that extremely large earnings increases (between 100 and 200% or over 200%) were on average associated with price increases around the earnings announcement date. Conversely, steep earnings drops (between 25 and 50% or over 50%) were associated with declining prices. Although these results should have been of interest to the new breed of accounting researchers, the Social Sciences Citation Index reveals only four citations of Ashley's information content result in the accounting literature (and two of these citations are by the same set of authors). Thus, accounting researchers behaved as if they were unaware of empirical evidence on the relation between corporate earnings and prices. 9 8 Ball (1994) discusses the critical importance of the development of event study methodology. He notes that even as late as the mid-1960's the``stock market was generally viewed as exhibiting little economic order whatsoever'' (p. 6). He goes on to say that:
[T]o a pre-FFJR [Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969) ] observer of stock markets, the existence of systematic market behavior in response to information was almost unthinkable (Ball, 1994, pp. 31±32) .
Prior to FFJR, we looked at the market reaction to information from the limited perspective of chronological time. Reading the daily ®nancial press, for example, we observe the market reaction at a single point in chronological time to a wide cross-section of events (such as earnings and dividend announcements,F F F,GDP data, and rumors). We tend to see a bewildering range of events and market reactions, all at once, without seeing the correlation. FFJR inverted that perspective: they investigated the market reaction to a single event at a cross-section of chronological timesF F F Where we previously had seen only chaos, FFJR saw order. FFJR were able to report visual plots of systematic, seemingly-rational market behavior around the time of an announcement, which no previous researcher had been successful in doing (Ball, 1994, p. 31) 9 There are several possible explanations for the dearth of citations to Ashley. First, Ashley (1962) is a short (four-page) paper published in the Journal of Political Economy. Even though JPE was edited at the University of Chicago Ð the birthplace of the price-earnings research paradigm Ð accountants may not have been aware of the short paper that was published by a professor at the University of Cincinnati before the revolution in empirical accounting research began. Second, Ashley's methods were primitive in relation to the methodological advances in place by 1968, so accounting researchers may not have considered the study of sucient quality to merit citation. Third, some researchers may have been reluctant to cite Ashley out of fear of diminishing the apparently novel contribution of the new price-earnings research in accounting. [Brown (1996, p. 730) highlights other instances of crediting accounting researchers for ideas developed outside of accounting.] Benston (1967) was the ®rst published largescale empirical accounting study. An ambitious and complex study, especially for a pioneering eort, Benston reported a modest but statistically signi®cant relation between`unexpected earnings' and announcement month stock returns. Speci®-cally, he concluded that a 100% change in the rate of change in unexpected earnings was associated with at best a 2% change in the monthly rate of change in security price, on average. Even though Benston was the ®rst published accounting study to document a relation between earnings and security prices, analysis of the Social Sciences Citation Index reveals that his study did not have the impact on the literature as did the subsequent Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) studies. Apparently, convincing the skeptics required more striking evidence than Benston was able to report given the data limitations at the time his study was conducted.
10 Ball and Brown (1968) tested for an association between earnings and prices, and they found a relation between the direction of the changes in earnings and stock prices. However, they concluded that most of the information in accounting earnings was already impounded in prices by the time earnings were ®nally announced. Thus, while Ball and Brown's evidence suggested that the direction of the change in earnings was value-relevant, the question of whether accounting earnings announcements were timely enough to convey material new value-relevant information to the market was still very much an open question.
Convincing the skeptics that at least some earnings announcements convey`new news' required strong evidence.
11 Using a sample of non-12/31 ®rms and dierent measures of market reaction, Beaver reported squared unexpected price movements that were on average 67% higher in announcement weeks than in non-announcement weeks, and he found that trading volume increased on average by 33% during earnings announcement weeks. Increases of this magnitude are clearly`material' and economically signi®cant, and provided persuasive evidence that earnings announcements convey new information to the market.
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Beaver's (1968) study, as well as Ball and Brown (1968) and Benston (1967) , provided the``notable scienti®c achievement'' that was suciently novel and convincing to``attract most of the next generation's practitioners'' (Kuhn, 1970, p. 18 ). This fundamental shift in research taste rapidly devalued the human capital of the prior generation's normative researchers whose training preceded the empirical revolution. 13, 14 The new research paradigm oered a more attractive option for ambitious researchers intent on building a record to support promotion and tenure. In contrast to the cacophonic voices engaged in normative research, the new paradigm``provided clear-cut research problems and examples of acceptable research methods'', which gave younger researchers con®dence that work within this paradigmatic framework would ®nd acceptance (Mouck 1993, p. 41) . Because the new empirical research required a set of skills that normative writers did not possess and for the most part could not substantively critique, the new paradigm oered protection in the form of barriers to entry that prevented the paradigm from being¯ooded with competitors and critics. Prestigious outlets such as the Journal of Accounting Research and its associated conference that fostered the new empirical research were eectively closed to the normative writers. The new paradigm gained cachet (largely at the expense of the prior generation of normative writers) from association with the exciting new capital markets paradigm in ®nance led by high-pro®le scholars such as Fama, Jensen and Scholes. Kuhn (1970, p. 19) suggests that``The new paradigm implies a new and more rigid de®nition of the ®eld.'' The core beliefs of the emerging empirical capital markets research paradigm in accounting centered around theoretical developments in ®nance (e.g. portfolio theory, the capital asset pricing model, the ecient markets hypothesis), the development of large-scale event-study methodology, and the shared belief that earnings announcements were useful in making investment decisions. Researchers participating in the new capital markets paradigm soon ®t Kuhn's (p. 177) characterization of a scienti®c community:
To an extent unparalleled in most other ®elds, [members of a scienti®c community] have undergone similar educations and professional initiations; in the process they have absorbed the same technical literature and drawn many of the same lessons from it. Usually the boundaries of that standard literature mark the limits of a scienti®c subject matter.... [T] he members of a scienti®c community see themselves and are seen by others as the men uniquely responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared goals, including the training of their successors. Within such groups communication is relatively full and professional judgement relatively unanimous.
Once the price-earnings research paradigm was established,``a more ecient mode of scienti®c practice [could begin]... generally esoteric and oriented to puzzle-solving, as the work of a group can be only when its members take the foundations of their ®eld for granted'' (Kuhn, 1970, p. 178) . Kuhn terms this``normal science.'' 2.1.3.`Normal science' and the generalization of early evidence in the price-earnings paradigm Kuhn (1970) suggests that pre-paradigm authors begin anew developing foundations for their arguments. Such papers stand alone and so are reasonably understandable by intelligent readers. In contrast, normal science research questions are usually re®nements of the pillars of the paradigm's foundations, becoming evermore esoteric as the paradigm matures. The results of research in normal science``usually appear as brief articles addressed only to professional colleagues, the men whose knowledge of a shared paradigm can be assumed and who prove to be the only ones able to read the papers addressed to them'' (p. 20).
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In normal science, the paradigm's adherents anticipate the appropriate research methods and even the results of future research. 16 Kaplan's (1978, p. 168 ) review of information content research reveals that Kuhn's characterization of normal science ®t quite well the state of accounting research:
Current research is involved with cleaning up some of the past studies by controlling for or testing a number of factors that were not included in the original research.... At best though, these studies will con®rm the ®ndings of the earlier studies by showing that the results follow even under more careful testing or using a more sophisticated methodology, and the conclusions from such studies will, therefore, be consistent with our current beliefs. Kuhn (1970) suggests that another characteristic of normal science is the tendency to ignore inconvenient evidence, or anomalies:
And the project whose outcome does not fall in that narrower range [of anticipated outcomes and thus assimilable results] is usually just a research failure, one which re¯ects not on nature but on the scientist. (Kuhn 1970, p. 35) .
Thus, normal science is primarily engaged in solving puzzles for which the paradigm's adherents pre-suppose`the answer'. What is at issue is not the result, but merely the ingenious means necessary to obtain the pre-supposed outcome. Kuhn's description of normal science aptly ®ts the academic accounting community, as shown by the following citation evidence revealing that we have collectively dismissed evidence at odds with the paradigmatic thinking in price-earnings research.
Citation analysis
The price-earnings research paradigm overlooked evidence that the information content of earnings announcements may be smaller in magnitude and less pervasive than was apparent from Beaver's original work. The literature virtually ignored the ®rst post-Beaver published study reporting little or no market reaction to earnings announcements. Oppong's (1980) study of market reactions to 12/31 ®scal year-end NYSE ®rms' earnings announcements should have been of interest as a complement to Beaver's (1968) analysis of non-12/31 NYSE ®rms' earnings announcements. However, Oppong reports either no reaction or at best a weak reaction to 12/31 NYSE ®rms' annual earnings announcements. Even though Oppong's results should have been noteworthy when the study was published, and even though the study was published as a main article in Journal of Accounting Research, subsequent priceearnings research has largely ignored its evidence. Table 1 shows that Oppong has received a total of only ®ve citations in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI). Panel A of Table 1 reports that of these ®ve citations, only two refer to the study's conclusion that its sample of earnings announcements were at best only marginally informative.
The literature also largely ignored similar inconvenient evidence reported in Atiase (1985) . Research typically interprets Atiase as suggesting that small ®rms' earnings announcements are more informative than large ®rms' earnings announcements. While true, this ignores the important but inconvenient fact that Atiase ®nds no signi®cant price reaction to his large ®rms' earnings announcements. As Panel B of Table 1 shows, of the 27 post-1990 SSCI references to Atiase's``size eect,'' none mention that he found no reaction to large ®rms' announcements. While three of the pre-1990 citations acknowledge Atiase's anomalous evidence, two of these are the same papers that also acknowledge Oppong's anomalous evidence. Thus, the SSCI reveals that only three dierent articles (the most recent of which was published in 1989) have recognized either Oppong's (1980) or Atiase's (1985) evidence questioning the magnitude and pervasiveness of the market's reaction to earnings announcements.
Post-Beaver research has also largely overlooked two aspects of Beaver's (1968) research design that increased the chances of reporting large market reactions to accounting earnings announcements: (1) the focus on the crosssectional mean market reaction, and (2) the sample selection criteria. To measure price reaction, Beaver (1968) employs cross-sectional means of standardized squared market model prediction errors. Extreme values can have a large impact on squared market model prediction errors, so a small number of extreme values could greatly increase the cross-sectional mean of the squared prediction errors. Citation analysis reveals that virtually none of the research citing Beaver's information content conclusion questioned whether his cross-sectional mean results were`typical' of the reaction to individual earnings announcements. More generally, despite Ball's (1994, p. 28) query:``How frequently is a sample average residual dominated by a small number of outliers...?'' subsequent research has not addressed the pervasiveness of the market's reaction to earnings announcements.
Beaver employed sample selection criteria that 30 years of hindsight suggest eectively increased the chances of ®nding signi®cant market reactions to earnings announcements. His sample included earnings announcements of non-12/31 NYSE ®rms with fewer than 20 news items in the WSJ during the year. Beaver (1968, pp. 70±71) limited the analysis to non-12/31 ®rms to avoid event clustering, 17 and invoked the 20 news item limit to obtain a cleaner non-announcement period. Non-12/31 ®rms are on average smaller than 12/31 ®rms (Smith & Pourciau, 1988) , and Atiase (1985) and Bamber (1987) show that price and volume reactions to small ®rms' earnings announcements exceed the reactions to larger ®rms' announcements. Also, Grant (1980) and Shores (1990) provide evidence that the magnitude of the price reaction to earnings announcements is a decreasing function of the number of WSJ announcements. Thus, Beaver's analysis was con®ned to smaller ®rms with fewer news items (i.e. less predisclosure information), which in turn increased the likelihood of a signi®cant reaction to earnings announcements.
18
In the historical context in which the research was conducted, this directed sampling approach (which was likely unintentional at the time) was Table 1 The tendency to ignore inconvenient evidence: analysis of citations of Oppong (1980) and Atiase (1985) Oppong (1980) and Atiase (1985) listed in the Social Sciences Citation Index. To be included in this analysis, the citations must cite the studies in an information content context. 17 Most researchers suggest that they use this criterion to avoid underestimation of the standard deviation in the presence of cross-sectional correlation. On the other hand, Beaver's rationale is that``When earnings announcements cluster, ... any attempt to remove the eects of market-wide events would eliminate [some of] the eects of the earnings report as well'' (p. 71). However, even if clustered, earnings announcements should not aect market returns if positive returns roughly oset negative returns. 18 The next information content study, May (1971) , is based on a sample of 105 AMEX ®rms. Thus, the ®rst two information content studies used ®rms that were on average smaller than the typical NYSE ®rm, and as a result, these two studies' earnings announcements were more likely to be informative. reasonable. Wallace (1991, p. 35) suggests that`d irected sampling'' can be appropriate wheǹ`r esearchers will design the study to maximize thè aected' group... on the premise that, if an eect is not discernable for that group, then it is unlikely it would be ... of importance in drawing inferences to a wider group.'' However, she cautions that`T he price of directing the study is that the inferences drawn must be similarly directed to the population from which the sample was selected.'' While Beaver's evidence was sucient to refute the view that earnings announcements were useless to investors, the magnitude of the reported market reaction was unlikely to be representative of a broader population. It is important to note, however, that Beaver carefully pointed out the likely bias induced by at least one of the sample selection criteria, and he cautioned against generalizing the study's results to other populations of earnings announcements:
It is possible that the selection criteria, especially criterion (6) [that there be less than 20 news announcements per year in the WSJ] may induce some bias in the [information content] direction. As long as the criteria are visible ex ante, the population for which the study's ®ndings are relevant can be easily identi®ed (p. 72).
Nevertheless, most subsequent researchers' references to Beaver's results did generalize, implicitly or explicitly, without acknowledging the likely threats to external validity imposed by the sample selection criteria. This is consistent with Kuhn's (1970, p. 178) observation that adherents of normal science paradigms``take the foundations of their ®eld for granted'' in subsequent research. Table 2 tabulates the references to Beaver's (1968) conclusion that his sample earnings announcements are informative, on average. Most of these references (123) were identi®ed from the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), and 9 were identi®ed from other sources including books, monographs, and research reports.
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Panel A categorizes the citations by source (SSCI or Other), by type of citing source (research article or review), and by the manner in which Beaver (1968) is cited. Other than Davidson's (1968) discussion of Beaver's paper at the Journal of Accounting Research conference, these citations did not question whether the cross-sectional mean results were`typical' of the reaction to individual earnings announcements. Consequently, Table 2 partitions based on acknowledgment of potential eects of the second research design choice Ð the sample selection criteria. Citations that implicitly or explicitly acknowledge the potential eects of Beaver's sample selection criteria are listed on the left side of the table, while citations that fail to do so are shown on the right. Panel A further partitions citations failing to acknowledge Beaver's sample selection criteria into those that refer to the speci®c numerical magnitude of his observed reactions, and/or reprint one or more of the well-known ®gures (e.g. Beaver's Figs. 1, 3 or 6), versus those that cite Beaver's results in a general, qualitative fashion.
Panel A reveals that only 8 of the 132 total citations (6.1%) acknowledge the potential eects of Beaver's sample selection criteria, and more important, only 2 of the 29 (2+8+19) reviews (6.9%) do so. The low proportion of reviews that acknowledge Beaver's sample selection criteria is disturbing because reviews distill`stylized facts' Ð misleading or incomplete statements are likely to stimulate unwarranted generalization. Eight of the 19 We found 245 citations of Beaver (1968) in Social Sciences Citation Indexes. Of these, 6 were not written in English, 20 did not actually refer to Beaver (1968) in the text even though they listed Beaver (1968) among the references, and 96 referenced Beaver (1968) for reasons unrelated to the conclusion that earnings announcements are informative. Table 2 categorizes the remaining 123 citations, plus nine additional citations from other sources, including : Dyckman, Downes and Magee (1975) , Foster (1986) , Dyckman and Morse (1986) , Watts and Zimmerman (1986) , Grin (1987) , Bernard (1989) , Beaver (1989 ), Bernard (1991 ), and Ball (1994 . More detailed analysis of these 132 citations to Beaver's (1968) information content result reveals that the paper has been cited in a substantive fashion by a wide cross-section of citing authors. For example, 170 dierent authors were involved in the 132 citing sources, and only 14 (10%) of the citing articles were authored by Beaver or a Stanford Ph.D. Moreover, our (necessarily subjective) evaluation of each citation revealed that 130 of the 132 citations of Beaver's information content inference are in our opinion clearly substantive, warranted citations, given the context of the citing research. 29 reviews (27.6%) refer to the speci®c magnitude of Beaver's reported average reactions, a ®nding that is unlikely to arise in other samples. Six reviews (20.7%) reprinted one or more of Beaver's ®gures, where the large earnings announcement week spikes provide salient visual cues suggesting that earnings announcements are associated with strong market reactions. Evidence reported in Panel B reveals that the tone of these references has not changed in recent years. Beaver (1968) continues to be heavily cited, and 96% (26Ä27) of the references in the most recent six-year period fail to acknowledge the likely eects of Beaver's sample selection criteria. Thus, the received wisdom in the price±earnings paradigm is that the market reacts strongly to accounting earnings announcements. 20 In sum, our citation analysis shows that post-Beaver normal science has largely overlooked both (1) counter-evidence reported in Oppong (1980) and Atiase (1985) , and (2) aspects Table 2 Analysis of citations of Beaver's (1968) 0  0  20  3  23  1980±1984  2  0  24  3  29  1985±1990  3  2  21  7  33  1991±1996  1  0  21  5  27  Total  6  2  97  27  132 a English language citations of Beaver (1968) listed in the Social Sciences Citation Index. To be included, the citation must reference Beaver's conclusion that earnings announcements are``informative''.
b`O ther' citations located from various sources. These include Dyckman et al., (1975 ), Foster (1986 , Dyckman and Morse (1986) , Watts and Zimmerman (1986) , Grin (1987) , Bernard (1989) , Beaver (1989) , Bernard (1991), and Ball (1994 Beaver's paper is highly cited because it showed that earnings are informative for both stock price variance and trading volume (Brown 1996, p. 730) It has long been documented that there is much unusual stock price activity immediately surrounding earnings announcements (Bernard 1991, p. 305) .
One of the most robust ®ndings in the ®nancial statement research area is that the release of interim and annual earnings is associated with both increased trading volume and increased security return variability (Foster, 1986, p. 377) . of Beaver's research design (focus on the cross-sectional mean reaction and sample selection criteria) that likely increase the magnitude of the observed market reaction to earnings announcements.
We investigate eects of two alternative research design choices that would have been reasonable at the time Beaver (1968) was conducted. First, rather than simply reporting the cross-sectional mean market reactions, we also investigate the pervasiveness of market reactions to earnings announcements. Speci®cally, we provide new evidence on the proportion of earnings announcements that stimulate an unusual market reaction. This statistic is not unduly in¯uenced by a few extreme observations, in contrast to the cross-sectional mean statistic. This analysis will help determine whether:
(1) only a few earnings announcements generate large price reactions while most stimulate little unusual price activity, or (2) most earnings announcements stimulate a modest amount of unusual price activity. Second, during the mid-1960's when there was no empirical evidence on the information content of any ®rms' announcements, there would have been interest in the informativeness of major ®rms' earnings announcements. Therefore, in addition to examining reactions to earnings announcements made by ®rms meeting Beaver's sample selection criteria, we also investigate reactions to earnings announcements made by the era's Fortune 200.
Research method
Sample selection
We ®rst develop a set of ®rms comparable to Beaver (1968 and he also eliminated announcements that were potentially confounded by dividend announcements during the earnings announcement week or stock splits announced within 17 weeks centered on the earnings announcement week. These criteria led to a sample of smaller-than-average NYSE ®rms that constituted only 5.1% of the NYSE market value.
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Approximating Beaver's set of ®rms 30 years later requires considerable care. The Appendix explains the details of our sample construction procedure. We identi®ed an initial group of 255 non-12/31 NYSE ®rms that had CRSP data and were listed on COMPUSTAT during 1962±1966. This is very close to Beaver's initial set of 242 non-12/31 NYSE ®rms with COMPUSTAT and CRSP data, as reported in his Table 1 . For these 255 ®rms, we found a total of 1,079 earnings announcements in the WSJ, over ®scal years 1962±1966. Hereafter, we term these the`Beaver-like announcements'.
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For the alternative sample, we identi®ed the Fortune 200 ®rms during 1962±1966. 24 The WSJ listed a total of 941 earnings announcements for these ®rms, for ®scal years 1962 to 1966. Given the paucity of research on the information content of any ®rm's earnings announcements at the time 21 In his random sample of 100 NYSE ®rms in the period 1960±1964, Grant (1980) reports that the median number of Wall Street Journal news items is 14. Beaver's 20 item cuto is well above the typical number of announcements per ®rm during that period. 22 For Beaver's sample we calculate: (143 ®rms)Â($189 million average market value of a sample ®rm's common shares outstanding, per p. 71 of Beaver)Ä($528,190 million total market value of NYSE common shares outstanding)=5.1% of NYSE market value.
23 Our Beaver-like sample of 1,079 annual earnings announcements by non-12/31 ®rms is a very dierent sample from Atiase's (1985) ``small NYSE/AMEX ®rm'' sample, which includes 50 second quarter earnings announcements of the very smallest 12/31 ®scal year-end ®rms (less than $20 million market value). The average market value of our Beaverlike ®rms is over 7 times higher than the $20 million upper limit on Atiase's`small ®rm' sample.
24 Twenty-three of the Fortune 200 ®rms also meet the criteria for our Beaver-like ®rms. Since our purpose is to illustrate the eects of dierent sample selection criteria (rather than to partition one sample into mutually exclusive sub-samples), we include the 23 ®rms in both the Beaver and the Fortune 200 groups. This works against ®nding signi®cant dierences between the two groups. One of the Fortune 200 ®rms, Anheuser-Busch, was traded on the Nasdaq until 1980, so this ®rm's earnings announcements are omitted from the analysis. Beaver (1968) was conducted, evidence on the Fortune 200 would have been of interest, as these ®rms constituted two-thirds of the market value of the NYSE during that time.
25
Our analysis follows Beaver's approach, with two minor exceptions. First, while Beaver's data covered 1961 to 1965, we use data from 1962±1966 because this is the earliest period for which CRSP data are currently available. Second, Beaver eliminated earnings announcements made by ®rms about which there were 20 or more WSJ news items during the year. This criterion eliminated less than 20% of Beaver's data, since his sample included only non-12/31 ®rms which are on average smaller and less intensely covered by news media. 26 However, application of this news restriction to the intensely covered Fortune 200 would not only eliminate most of the earnings announcements (nearly 60%), but it would eliminate those announcements for which the most predisclosure information was available, leading to a biased sample of earnings announcements that are more likely to be informative. Thus, we do not apply Beaver's 20 news item criterion in the analysis reported formally in our tables, although our discussion will explain the results we obtain upon applying this criterion. The analysis reported here does apply Beaver's stock split and dividend announcement restrictions, which reduce the Beaver-like sample from 1,079 to 854 announcements, and the Fortune 200 sample from 941 to 664 announcements. (Analysis of the full samples of 1,079 and 941 announcements yield results that are very similar to those reported here.)
Beaver presented evidence on both price and volume reactions to earnings announcements. While we analyzed both price and volume reactions, the inferences from volume reactions are quite similar to those based on price reactions. Hence, we con®ne the discussion to price reactions.
Announcement and parameter estimation periods
Earnings announcement dates are obtained from the Wall Street Journal Index. We examine weekly price reactions over a 17 week period centered on the earnings announcement week. 27 The parameter estimation period includes all weeks other than the 17 week announcement periods, as in Beaver (1968) .
Price reaction metric
The price reaction metric employs prediction errors from a ®rm-speci®c market-model:
where:
u iw = ®rm i's unexpected week w return, R iw = natural log of ®rm i's week w return, R mw = natural log of the return on Standard and Poors' Index (as in Beaver 1968) during week w, and aÃ i , b Ã i = ®rm i's market model parameter estimates, estimated over the parameter estimation period.
Beaver squared the unexpected return (to abstract from its sign), and normalized the resulting price 25 Our sample of 941 annual earnings announcements of Fortune 200 ®rms diers from Atiase's (1985) `large ®rm' sample, which is based on 100 second quarter earnings announcements of 12/31 ®scal year-end`large ®rms'. Researchers may have discounted Atiase's evidence of virtually no reaction to large ®rms' earnings announcements because of concerns about the power of analyses based on only 100 observations. 26 Application of the 20 news item restriction reduces our Beaver-like sample by about 15%. 27 Announcements appearing in the WSJ on Mondays are typically announced on the Broad Tape on the preceeding Friday. Hence, for Monday announcements, the week prior to the WSJ announcement is the earnings announcement week.
28 While squaring exacerbates the eect of extreme values, the problem identi®ed in our study is not simply attributable to this eect of the squaring operation. We obtain qualitatively similar inferences using May's (1971) price reaction metric, which is less sensitive to extreme values in both the announcement and estimation periods, because it is de®ned as the absolute value of the announcement period unexpected return divided by the (®rm-speci®c) mean of the absolute values of the estimation period unexpected returns. reaction measure by the variance of estimation period unexpected returns. 28 He labeled this the U ratio:
and s i 2 is the estimated variance of ®rm i's weekly unexpected returns, calculated over the parameter estimation period. Following Beaver (1968), we report cross-sectional mean U statistics.
Beaver's U ratio measures announcement week price movement relative to the average price movement in the estimation period. If the ratio exceeds one, the announcement period price movement is higher than normal, and vice versa.
29 Beaver (1968) and subsequent researchers have considered 1.0 as a benchmark hurdle for inferring that U's (price movements) are abnormally high.
Results
Beaver-like sample
The left-hand side of Table 3 reports cross-sectional mean U's for our Beaver-like ®rms' earnings announcements throughout the 17 week period centered on the earnings announcement date. Fig. 1 plots these results. There is a strong spike at week 0, and this announcement week U is signi®cantly higher (p 0.05) than the U in each of the surrounding weeks (except for week +5). The announcement week cross-sectional mean U is 1.453 Ð about 45% higher than its expected value.
30 Given Beaver's (1968, p. 79 ) benchmark that U's greater than 1.0 mean that the``price change is larger than normal,'' our results con®rm Beaver's original conclusion that, on average, earnings announcements for non-12/31 NYSE ®rms are associated with unusual price movements. However, the cross-sectional average does not answer other important questions. How pervasive are market reactions of this magnitude? What proportion of earnings announcements convey new information to the market and cause any unusual announcement week price reaction?
To address these questions, the third column of Table 3 presents the proportion of Beaver-like earnings announcements whose announcement week price variability exceeds the ®rm-speci®c average non-announcement price variability (i.e., where U's exceed 1.0). 31 This reveals a very dierent picture than the cross-sectional mean U's. Only 33.7% of the earnings announcements generate U's exceeding 1.0, which is not very impressive given that on average 25.8% of the U's exceed 1.0 even in the surrounding 16-week 29 Patell (1976) shows that the U's theoretical expected value is slightly greater than 1.0 (1.02 in our study) due to prediction error and properties of the F distribution. 30 The 20 news item restriction does not aect inferences for the Beaver-like ®rms, since the announcement week cross-sectional mean U is 1.4 even after applying this restriction. Thus, our announcement week cross-sectional mean U is slightly lower than the 1.67 reported by Beaver (1968) . Despite eorts to ensure that our ®rms are as close as possible to Beaver's (see our Appendix), there may be some dierences. Also, Beaver's time period spanned 1961±1965, while our sample includes earnings announcements made after July 1962 (the beginning of the CRSP tapes) up to announcements of ®scal years ending by December 1966. 31 Little is known about the true empirical time-series or cross-sectional distributions of U ratios. Patell (1976) showed that the within-®rm time-series distribution of a ®rm's U ratios is a scaled F distribution (scaled to account for predicting announcement period unexpected returns outside the parameter estimation period), provided that the market model residuals are normally distributed. Under this assumption, the theoretical expectation is that, even in the absence of an announcement, 32% of a given ®rm's weekly non-announcement period U's would exceed 1.0. However, Marais (1984) pointed out that the (within-®rm) time-series distribution of returns is leptokurtic for many ®rms. This aects the variance, but not the mean of the U distribution. Marais showed that for normally distributed returns the asymptotic variance of the U ratio is 2, whereas for leptokurtic returns the asymptotic variance of U equals 2+ the kurtosis of estimation period market model residuals. Using Patell's earnings forecast data and a random sample of 1000 weekly returns for NYSE ®rms, Marais found that the kurtosis of these residuals ranged between 2.5 and 4.0. Thus, dispersion among U ratios was higher than implied by Patell's (1976) analysis, indicating that there are apt to be more of the highly extreme values in the upper tail of the distribution of U ratios, and more values close to zero, than occurs in a scaled F distribution.
non-announcement period. 32, 33 Thus, even for the Beaver-like announcements, signi®cant cross-sectional market reactions at the announcement date are driven by the speci®c reactions to a relatively small number of announcements. Focus on the cross-sectional average market reaction has obscured the fact that even for the Beaver-like ®rms, most of the earnings announcements generate little unusual price variability.
However, requiring U's to exceed 1.0 is a low, or easily achievable benchmark. Alternative benchmarks for assessing unusual price movements might consider U's unusually high only if they are in the top 5±10% of the distribution of ®rm-speci®c non-announcement period U's. Relative to Beaver (1968) focusses on cross-sectional mean results, and does not report the percentage of U's exceeding 1.0. However, the study does report sucient data to enable the reader to make this calculation. Page 82 reveals that 181 of the announcement week U's exceed 1.0. Combining this with the sample size of 506 announcements (page 72) reveals that 181/506=35.8% of the earnings announcements generated U's exceeding 1.0. The citation analysis described in Table 2 did not reveal a single reference to this implication. More generally, subsequent research did not question whether the cross-sectional mean results were representative of reactions to typical individual earnings announcements. While Beaver (1968) reports sucient data to raise a question about the pervasiveness of the market reaction to earnings announcements, our citation evidence indicates that subsequent researchers overlooked these clues. 33 The proportion of U's exceeding 1.0 is signi®cantly higher in the announcement week than in each of the surrounding 16 non-announcement weeks (p<0.03). the 1.0 benchmark, such alternative and more demanding benchmarks classify an even smaller proportion of price reactions as abnormally high. We construct such alternative ®rm-and announcement-speci®c benchmarks by ranking a ®rm's announcement week U relative to the distribution of the ®rm's U's from the surrounding 16 non-announcement weeks. 34 For each earnings announcement, we performed the following steps:
1. For the 17 week period centered on the ®rm's earnings announcement week, rank the ®rm's U's from weeks À8 to +8 so that the week with the highest U is assigned rank 1 and the week with the smallest U is assigned rank 17. 2. Perform a cross-sectional analysis of the ranks of earnings announcement week U's.
2(A)
Compute the proportion of sample earnings announcement week U's that are assigned rank 1, the proportion of announcement week U's assigned rank 2, and so on to the proportion of announcement U's assigned rank 17. 2(B) Construct a frequency histogram displaying the proportion of earnings announcement week U's assigned rank 1, the proportion assigned rank 2, and so on to the proportion assigned rank 17. Fig. 2 depicts the percentage of earnings announcement week U's that are assigned each of the 17 ranks. Under the null hypothesis of no information content, 1/17 (about 5.9%) of the earnings announcement week U's fall in each of the 17 ranks. If earnings announcements are informative, the announcement week U's should concentrate in ranks 1 and 2. However, Fig. 2 shows that only 10.8% of the announcement week U's are assigned rank 1 (i.e. generate U's that are the highest in their 17 week period). Similarly, only 7.5% of the earnings announcement week U's are assigned rank 2. The proportion of earnings announcement week U's assigned each of the other 15 ranks is not signi®cantly dierent from that expected in the absence of an announcement (except that the proportion assigned rank 14 is Fig. 1 . Price reactions (cross-sectional mean U-statistics) to Beaver-like earnings announcements. 34 We thank George Foster for suggesting this analysis. below the expected 5.9%). The histogram con®rms that even for the Beaver-like announcements, the information content inference is driven by a small proportion of earnings announcements. Only 18.3% (10.8+7.5%) of the earnings announcement U's are assigned ranks 1 and 2, which is not very impressive given that 11.8% (2Â5.9%) of the U's would be expected in these two ranks even in the absence of an earnings announcement.
Fortune 200 sample
Evidence regarding market reactions to the Fortune 200 ®rms' earnings announcements appears in the right-hand side of Table 3 , and in Fig. 3 . The Fortune 200 cross-sectional mean announcement period U is 1.179 Ð about 18% higher than its expected value of 1. However, this is less than half the magnitude of the 45% reaction to the Beaver-like announcements.
35 Fig. 3 illustrates this dierence by superimposing plots of the Beaver-like versus Fortune 200 U's. In addition to being smaller in magnitude, there is less evidence that Fortune 200 announcement week reactions are unique, since the magnitude of the crosssectional mean announcement week U is not signi®cantly dierent from 11 of the other 16 weeks' cross-sectional mean U's.
To investigate the pervasiveness of market reactions to the Fortune 200 earnings announcements, the rightmost column of Table 3 presents the proportion of U's that exceed 1.0. Only 30% of these earnings announcements generate U's exceeding 1.0, an even smaller proportion than the Beaverlike earnings announcements. This is not very impressive, given that in non-announcement periods, 27.3% of the weekly U's exceed 1.0. Thus, the signi®cant cross-sectional average market reaction is driven by the speci®c reactions to an even smaller proportion of earnings announcements than in the Beaver-like sample. Table 3 also reveals that the proportion of U's exceeding 1.0 is generally not uniquely high in the earnings announcement week, since the announcement period proportion is not Fig. 2 . Ranking of Beaver-like ®rms' announcement week price movements (U-statistics) relative to weekly price movements in the surrounding (nonannouncement) 16 weeks. For the 17 week period centered on the ®rm's earnings announcement, we rank the ®rm's weekly U's from weeks À8 to +8, so that the week with the highest U is ranked 1, and the week with lowest U is ranked 17. The ®gure displays the % of announcment week U's assigned rank 1, the % assigned rank 2, and so on to the % assigned rank 17. In the absence of an announcement, 5.88% (1/17) of the weekly U's would be expected to fall in each of the 17 ranks.
signi®cantly dierent from 12 of the 16 surrounding non-announcement weeks.
To further assess the pervasiveness of the market reaction, for each of the Fortune 200 announcements we rank the U's from weeks À8 to +8, where the week with the highest U is ranked 1, and the week with the lowest U is ranked 17. Fig. 4 reports the proportion of Fortune 200 earnings announcement week U's in each of the 17 ranks. The evidence is even more striking than analogous evidence for the Beaver-like announcements. For the Fortune 200, the proportion of announcement week U's assigned each of the low ranks is not signi®cantly dierent from the 5.9% expected in the absence of an earnings announcement! Only 7.3% of the announcement week U's are assigned rank 1 (generate U's that are the highest in the 17 week period). This is not signi®cantly dierent from the 5.9% expected in the absence of an announcement. Except for rank 14 where there are fewer announcements than expected under the null, the proportion of earnings announcement U's falling in each of the ranks is not signi®cantly dierent from the 5.9% expected in the absence of an announcement. The histogram con®rms that the information content inference regarding the Fortune 200 earnings announcements is attributable to a small proportion of the announcements. 36 Results presented in Table 3 and Figs. 1±4 are based on earnings announcements that are not confounded by dividend announcements or stock splits. We did not apply Beaver's 20 news item restriction in this analysis because the news criterion is not related to contemporaneous contaminating`events', and it eliminates ®rms with signi®cant public predisclosure information. Eliminating earnings announcements of ®rms for which the WSJ has published 20 or more items during the year has little eect on our results for the Beaver-like announcements, as only 15% are eliminated. In contrast, the Fortune 200 are heavily covered by the WSJ and the news criterion eliminates nearly 60% of our Fortune 200 announcements. For the remaining Fortune 200 ®rms there are fewer alternative sources of information, so their earnings announcements are more likely to be informative. Applying the 20 news item restriction defeats the purpose of using the Fortune 200 to assess the generalizability of Beaver's results to a dierent and economically important population of ®rms. Consequently, it is not surprising that the market response to these`neglected' Fortune 200 ®rms' earnings announcements is similar to the reaction to Beaver-like ®rms' announcements (the announcement week cross-sectional mean U for the`neglected' 40% of the Fortune 200 announcements is 1.3, and 33% of these announcements' U's exceed 1.) Thus, the market reaction to Fortune 200 earnings announcements is sensitive to the predisclosure information environment.
In conclusion, for both the Beaver-like and the Fortune 200 announcements, focus on the crosssectional mean market reaction has obscured the fact that there is little evidence of an unusual price reaction for most of the earnings announcements. The evidence reported here, especially in Figs. 2 and 4, questions the validity of the`stylized fact' that accounting earnings announcements typically convey new information to the market.
Summary, conclusions, and implications
While accounting scholars`think we understand' that the results and generalizability of research studies are sensitive to research design choices, this paper provides evidence that we have collectively failed to apply this understanding in practice. Consistent with Kuhn's (1970) observation that a paradigm's disciples take for granted their paradigm's foundations, we ®nd that the community of accounting researchers has failed to appreciate fully the likely eects of the (necessarily) subjective research design choices in Beaver's (1968) seminal paper The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements.
37 Our citation analysis shows that subsequent research misinterpreted Beaver's evidence: (1) by viewing the cross-sectional mean reaction as`typical' of the reaction to individual earnings announcements, and (2) by failing to appreciate the implications of the sample selection criteria. The citation analysis also reveals that subsequent research largely overlooked counter-evidence reported by 37 Our analysis is not a criticism of Beaver's (1968) seminal study. Rather, we raise concerns about subsequent researchers' interpretations of Beaver's evidence. We could have selected studies other than Beaver (1968) to illustrate subsequent misinterpretations or overlooking of evidence, such as May (1971) , Oppong (1980 ), or Atiase (1985 . Another example of this phenomenon is the way researchers for many years virtually ignored the post-announcement drift apparent in Ball and Brown's (1968) Fig. 1 . Fig. 4 . Ranking of Fortune 200 ®rms' announcement week price movements (U-statistics) relative to weekly price movements in the surrounding (nonannouncement) 16 weeks. For the 17 week period centered on the ®rm's earnings announcment, we rank the ®rm's weekly U's from weeks À8 to +8, so that the week with the highest U is ranked 1, and the week with the lowest U is ranked 17. The ®gure displays the % of announcement week U's assigned rank 1, the % assigned rank 2, and so on to the % assigned rank 17. (In the absence of an announcement, 5.88% (1/17) of the weekly U's would be expected to fall in each of the 17 ranks.) Oppong (1980) and Atiase (1985) , consistent with Kuhn's (1970) view that adherents of a paradigm ignore evidence counter to the paradigm's core beliefs. We then report results of new empirical analyses that provide evidence relevant to these misconceptions.
Our analyses question the extent to which earnings announcements convey new information to the market. With respect to the ®rst misinterpretation of Beaver's results, we ®nd that Ð for the smaller Beaver-like ®rms as well as for the larger Fortune 200 ®rms Ð there is no evidence of a signi®cant price reaction for the majority of earnings announcements. This new evidence suggests that the focus on cross-sectional means has obscured the fact that signi®cant mean reactions have been driven by a small proportion of announcements, and in fact, there is no evidence that most earnings announcements convey new information to the market.
With respect to the second misinterpretation of Beaver's (1968) results, the vast majority of subsequent research fails to acknowledge that Beaver's sample selection criteria (non-12/31 ®rms with less than 20 other news items in the WSJ that year) led to a sample of smaller-than-average ®rms. In fact, Beaver's sample constituted only about 5% of the NYSE's total market value at the time. To provide evidence on the eect of these sample selection criteria on the generalizability of Beaver's results, we assessed the information content of earnings announcements made by an alternative set of ®rms Ð the Fortune 200. At the time Beaver's (1968) study was conducted, there was no evidence on the informativeness of any ®rms' earnings announcements, so the information content of such major ®rms' earnings announcements would have been of interest, particularly since the Fortune 200 constituted twothirds of the NYSE's total market value. While we ®nd a small cross-sectional mean reaction to the Fortune 200 earnings announcements, the magnitude of this reaction is statistically indistinguishable from price movements in several of the surrounding weeks. Moreover, relative to the Beaver-like announcements, an even smaller proportion of the Fortune 200 earnings announcements generate unusual price reactions, and depending on the benchmark, in some cases there is no evidence that the proportion of Fortune 200 ®rms with unusual market activity diers from that expected in the absence of an announcement.
These misinterpretations of Beaver's (1968) results are important because Beaver's evidence (in combination with May's (1971) evidence on the information content of AMEX ®rms' earnings announcements) formed the basis for the`stylized fact' that earnings announcements cover new information to the market. We now consider how several facets of the practice of science in the academic accounting community combined to foster an environment where`the placement of the ®rst research bricks aected the whole wall'.
The ®rst set of facets includes two cognitive biases to which individual researchers may be subject. As Hogarth (1987, p. 268 ) says of Kahneman and Tversky's (1972) representativeness heuristic,``We tend to imagine that what we seeF F Fis typical of what can occur. We seldom give credence to the possibility of`surprising' or`unusual' events. Hence, we tend to assess distributions which are too tight.'' Researchers susceptible to the representativeness heuristic are unlikely to appreciate that the mean eect may not be representative of the reaction to most of the individual announcements. The second cognitive bias is thè Law of Small Numbers. ' Tversky and Kahneman (1971) show that academics place too much con®dence in the results of small samples, which Hogarth (p. 219) notes``are likely to be atypical.'' Accounting researchers are likely to fall prey to the`Law of Small Numbers' by generalizing results from a small number of published research studies (often only a single study), which may have found atypical results.
The eects of these cognitive biases are exacerbated by the second set of factors Ð biases inherent in the review process. The review process in accounting suers from a reluctance to publish replications and a prejudice against the null. Unlike the physical sciences, replications are rarely published in major accounting journals (except for the short-lived`Improvements and Updates' section in Contemporary Accounting Research). Because of the limited publication of replications, accounting researchers have little choice but to generalize from a small number of published studies. The documented prejudice against the null raises a concern whether studies that are published have`typical' results. Greenwald (1975) points out that the majority of published research rejects the null hypothesis, and Lindsay (1994) reaches a similar conclusion after examining a subset of management accounting research. Greenwald argues that prejudice against the null delays the acquisition of knowledge by fostering the publication of studies whose results are true, but of limited generalizability.
38 In combination with the bias against replication, this can lead to a situation where the ®rst published studies are more likely to reject the null, and these initial studies have a disproportionate eect on subsequent research due to the bias against publishing replications. In the context of information content research, such a bias suggests that any studies that failed to ®nd information content (i.e. failed to reject the null hypothesis) would have faced more diculty in the review process than the original papers that rejected the null hypothesis.
The third factor is a bias suered by collective academic communities. Normal science is characterized by a tendency to overlook inconvenient evidence that is inconsistent with prevailing beliefs. Research results that do not turn out as expected are viewed as``just a research failure, one which re¯ects not on nature but on the scientist'' (Kuhn, 1970, p. 35) . Researchers interested in career advancement may hesitate to risk exile from the paradigm by questioning its core beliefs. This discounting of anomalous evidence combines with the`Law of Small Numbers' and the reluctance to publish replications to foster an environment where researchers heavily weight the results of a small number of initial studies. If those initial results do not`tell the whole story' (perhaps because of the prejudice against the null), these biases can delay the development, publication, and dissemination of evidence that tells`the rest of the story'.
Beaver's focus on cross-sectional mean reactions and the directed sampling approach (focusing on smaller ®rms with less predisclosure information) were reasonable research design choices Ð especially for the pioneering study in the historical context when the research was conducted. Nevertheless, if the initial information content studies had assessed the proportion of earnings announcements that were`informative' (rather than focussing on the cross-sectional mean reaction), or if the samples had not consisted of smaller-than-average ®rms [e.g., non-12/31 NYSE ®rms with less than 20 news announcements in Beaver (1968) and AMEX ®rms in May (1971) ], early views concerning the information content of earnings announcements would have been less sanguine. If subsequent researchers had more carefully examined the initial studies' methods and evidence, if they had understood the implications of the initial studies' sample selection criteria, or if they had appreciated that the mean market reaction might not be representative of`typical' market reactions, the community of accounting researchers would have been more skeptical from the outset, and less likely to dismiss anomalous evidence (e.g. Oppong 1980) . Our understanding of the earnings-return relation would likely have progressed more rapidly.
For example, ®nancial accounting researchers would likely have focussed on why most earnings announcements do not convey`new news' to the market. There are at least two possible explanations. Many ®rm-years' earnings announcements: (1) are``too late'' in that their information has been preempted, or (2) are not value-relevant. Investigation of the ®rst explanation would have accelerated research on predisclosure information. Researchers suspecting that earnings announcements are too late to convey new information to the market would have investigated the extent to which other disclosures (e.g. interim earnings, analysts' forecasts, voluntary management forecasts of earnings or sales) are informative and preempt the information content of the earnings announcement. Researchers may also have been more apt to recognize that related ®rms' earnings 38 At the extreme, with a 5% level of signi®cance, 5% of studies will inappropriately reject the null. The prejudice against the null suggests that there may be a bias in favor of publishing the study that inappropriately rejects the null, rather than the majority that failed to reject the null.
announcements can pre-empt information in a late-announcing ®rm's earnings number (e.g. intra-industry information transfers).
Investigation of the second explanation would have hastened research on the value-relevance of earnings. The weakness of the earnings-return relation would have been understood prior to the late 1980's (e.g. Lev, 1989) . Researchers would also have investigated cross-sectional and crosstemporal variation in the value-relevance of earnings, and begun much earlier the search for ®nan-cial and non-®nancial ®rm value-drivers (e.g. Amir & Lev 1996; Barth, Clement, Foster & Kasznik 1998 ; see also recent management accounting research reviewed in Ittner & Larcker 1998a) . Earlier documentation of the incremental valuerelevance of non-®nancial information similar to Barth and McNichols (1994) , Amir and Lev (1996) , and Ittner and Larcker (1998b) , coupled with greater insight into the apparent lack of new information content in most earnings announcements, might have stimulated a drive to expand the role of accounting beyond ®nancial information well before 1994 when the Jenkins report was issued (AICPA, 1994) . In sum, our collective failure to appreciate the eects of subjective research design choices, coupled with our misinterpretation of research evidence, delayed the acquisition of knowledge in ways that may have fundamentally aected the scope and role of accounting.
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While it will not be simple for the community of accounting scholars to address the biases highlighted here, the ®rst step is to increase awareness that a problem exists, and this has been the primary objective of our study. More speci®cally, we recommend that: Greenwald (1975) for further discussion on gracefully failing to reject the null, and Cready and Mynatt (1991) for a speci®c example in accounting. 4. Reviewers and editors should recognize the value of replications, and consider devoting some journal space to substantive replications 39 Our consideration of how ®nancial accounting research might have progressed had Beaver made dierent research design choices or had subsequent researchers not overgeneralized his results, is necessarily speculative. However, this discussion is consistent with the relatively recent rise of counterfactual reasoning in social sciences including history (e.g. Ferguson, 1998) and political science (e.g. Fearon, 1991) . According to Davis (1970, p. 76 )``counterfactual arguments are a part of all but purely descriptive history.'' Philip Tetlock, a professor of psychology and political science, argues that`c ounterfactual reasoning is a prerequisite for any form of learning from history'' (Orlans, 1997) , because``history doesn't provide us with control groups, so we have to construct them in our imaginations. In order for us to learn anything from history, we have to think about what didn't happen along with what did.'' (Psychology Today, 1998). 40 As an extreme example, Walster and Cleary (1970) propose a review process akin to that often applied to doctoral dissertations. They suggest that peer review occur before execution of the research, based on research proposals. Peer review exchanges between authors and referees could highlight likely eects of various research design choices before the work is executed. Walster and Cleary suggest that upon completion, research stemming from proposals approved by this peer review process could be published regardless of the statistical signi®cance of the results. While their suggestion would certainly require close scrutiny prior to a consideration of implementation (for example, how could authors be motivated to carefully conduct the research, if publication were already guaranteed?), such a proposal might: (a) focus more attention on research design, (b) mitigate the bias against publishing insigni®cant results (consistent with our recommendation 3), and (c) prevent referees and editors from suppressing results that they do not like (consistent with our recommendation 5). of important research. Unlike the hard sciences, replications have little stature in social sciences like accounting. This is particularly curious since our research consists largely of quasi-experiments using archival data that are often questionable proxies for the underlying constructs of interest, and laboratory experiments often based on participants who are questionable proxies for the population of decision-makers they are purported to represent. 5. When results of carefully conducted and powerful tests turn out unexpectedly, the entire community of accounting researchers should be on guard against blaming the scientist rather than nature. reviewers, and workshop participants at the University of Arizona, Case Western Reserve University, University of Connecticut, Emory University, University of Georgia, University of Melbourne, Michigan State University, University of Oklahoma, University of Oregon, and Texas A&M University.
Appendix: Construction of the`Beaver-like' sample Exact reconstruction of Beaver's sample is impossible because the CRSP and COMPUSTAT tapes he used are not currently available. His CRSP tape included data from at least 1961, whereas current CRSP tapes begin in July 1962. COMPUSTAT has a well-known survivorship bias in that it includes only ®rms existing when the tape is cut (i.e. it purges ®rms covered in previous years that subsequently went out of existence). Also, COMPUSTAT has extensively back®lled data (i.e. when COMPUSTAT begins covering a ®rm, it ®lls in historical as well as current period data). These practices considerably complicate reconstruction of Beaver's sample.
Our reconstruction is based on three assumptions. First, since Beaver's sample period covered 1961±1965, we assume that Beaver's COMPU-STAT tape ended with ®scal year 1965 data. Thus, we assume that his COMPUSTAT tape was cut between mid-1966 and mid-1967 6. From the 520 ®rms identi®ed in step 5(C), eliminate all ®rms that were not traded on the NYSE in 1965. Also, eliminate any ®rms whose ®scal year end date was actually 12/31, per the Wall Street Journal Index. This yielded a sample of 255 ®rms for our Beaver-like sample, which is very close to the 242 non-12/31 NYSE ®rms Beaver identi®ed in his Table 1 . 45 Despite our access to very dierent data resources, our sample selection yielded a sample size within 5% of Beaver's. Thus, our sample is a good approximation of that used by Beaver. 41 It is unlikely that any ®rms on the quarterly ®le were not covered on the annual ®le. 42 Beaver notes in his Table 1 that he found 896 ®rms on his COMPUSTAT tape. Our step 3 reveals that in later years, COMPUSTAT has provided ®scal year 1965 data for 1,976 ®rms. This evidences COMPUSTAT's extensive back®lling between 1967 and 1993. Our step 6 suggests that much of this back®lling involved non-NYSE ®rms. 43 These 464 ®rms may include some ®rms that were back®lled between 1967 and 1971. Such ®rms would not have been available to Beaver. Unfortunately, we have no means of identifying such ®rms. However, the results of step 6 below suggest that this is unlikely to be a serious problem. 44 These recovered ®rms must be ®rms for which COMPU-STAT reported annual but not quarterly data, or else the ®rms would have appeared on the quarterly back data tape in step 1. 45 Our NYSE screen eliminated about 50% of the sample ®rms from step 5c, which is considerably more than the approximately 20% eliminated by this screen in Beaver's sample (per his Table 1 ). This dierence suggests that much of COMPUSTAT's back®lling eorts were directed toward non-NYSE ®rms.
